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ABSTRACT
Electricity spot prices in emerging electricity markets exhibit high volatilities
and occasional distinctive price spikes due to the non-storable nature of electricity.
Furthermore, the inherent variability and uncertainty of renewable energy
generation require balancing supply and demand all the time for electric power
systems. In the context of reliable electricity service, demand response (DR)
programs allow end-users to adapt their electricity usage to changes in the price of
electricity over time. DR programs include price-based and incentive-based DR
programs. Real-time pricing (RTP) is a price-based DR program, which charges
customers electricity rates based on the utility’s real-time production costs. Electric
vehicles (EVs) can utilize their flexibility in load curtailment to provide potential
demand response opportunities. However, the current DR programs available do not
fully consider EVs’ potential for renewable energy integration through demand-side
management. In this research, we propose introducing financial options as additional
incentives for EV users under RTP, reinforcing their encouragement to align the
renewable energy supply peak better. Also, the proposed DR program can guarantee
peak load reduction reducing utility’s risk exposure in demand peak. A realistic
study on the Ontario electricity market shows that the proposed DR program
significantly saves EV users’ charging costs. Also, the research results show that the
proposed DR program allows electricity utilities to dynamically optimize electric
grid operations without increasing the price volatility and defer the need to construct
new generation capacity.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Renewable energy has become an ideal alternative to fossil fuels, which reduces greenhouse
gas emissions to the environment. As the market share of renewable energy increases, the
electricity facilities can diversify the energy supply and reduce dependence on conventional fossil
fuels. Nowadays, renewable energy sources provide about 18.9% of Canada’s total primary energy
supply [1]. Wind energy, one of the fastest-growing sources of electricity in Canada [1], has
become a new contributor to decrease the marginal cost of generating electricity. In 2019, Canada’s
installed wind generation capacity had reached 13,413 MW, and more than 300 wind farms are
operating across Canada [2]. With higher penetrations of renewable energy generation, the
intermittent renewable energy supply raises a great challenge for electric facilities balancing realtime supply and demand. Failure to balance equally will trigger an electricity outage incurred in
any economic loss. Also, the weather condition can greatly affect the renewable energy supply.
For example, the extreme cold weather froze most wind turbines caused an electricity blackout in
Texas in February 2021, which will cost nearly 200 million dollars for the blackout [3].
Traditionally, fossil fuel is reserved as a backup source in case insufficient wind energy supplies
electricity during extreme weather; however, the high generation cost can offset the benefits of
renewable energy. On the other hand, the excess wind energy supply causes wholesale electricity
price deflation due to the merit-order effect [4].
Thus, many electricity facilities have widely used demand response (DR) programs to balance
supply fluctuations and increase grid flexibility, allowing end-users to adjust their electricity
consumption based on the electricity rate. With DR programs, electricity facilities can avoid the
high cost of importing electricity to meet the peak demand in the short term and allowing electricity
1

utilities to build less new generating capacity in the long term. Different DR programs can be
classified into two main categories: incentive-based programs and price-based programs [5].
Incentive-based programs provide a certain incentive to large industrial or commercial customers;
in return, customers who receive incentives reduce or shift their electricity usage to off-peak
periods when demand requests occur. Price-based programs, that usually offered to small industrial
or individual customers, provide varying electricity prices over time, encouraging targeted
customers to consume electricity at times of low unit prices. However, without other Electric
Vehicles (EVs) aggregation, an individual EV user’s load is not enough to reach the minimum
load curtailment requirement of the incentive-based programs. Currently, most EV users are
charging under a price-based DR program, Time of Use (TOU) pricing, which has less demandside management on EVs charging. To reduce the cost, EV users tend to charge at off-peak hours,
which might charge at the same period as others, increasing grid stress.
As the amount of annual EVs sales in Canada increases steadily [6], coincidently charging
EVs at the same time can raise utility higher peak demand, while failure to balance production and
consumption causes a blackout or other cascading problem. Many studies have investigated the
integration of EVs into power systems without increasing the grid stress. Borba et al. proposed to
maximize the integration of wind energy supply in the power grid through scheduling plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles charging times [7]. Bellekom et al.’s study showed that implementing EVs
into power systems with load management can decrease the excess in wind electricity production
[8]. Wang et al. analyzed the interactions among PHEVs, wind power, and demand response,
concluding that the operating cost of the electricity system can be significantly reduced [9]. These
studies focus on the potential impact of EVs’ participating in DR programs; however, few studies
discuss what proper incentives for EV users yielding their load flexibility are. Due to the
2

uncertainty of renewable energy supply, price becomes more volatile, and electric utilities are
exposed to more financial risks. Therefore, a DR program with proper incentives and limited risks
can attract more EV users’ participation and allow electric utilities to optimize grid operations in
an economically efficient way.
Lessons and models learned from the financial markets suggest that financial options, with
well understood and properly utilized, are beneficial to hedging and reducing undesired risks
through properly structured option trading strategies. For example, electric utilities can avoid the
potential financial loss in the supply peak with a protective put option, which allows them to have
the right, but not the obligation to sell the electricity with a fixed unit price to lock in profits.
Therefore, financial options can be an effective tool for electric utilities in controlling the risk
caused by higher penetrations of renewable energy generation.
This research aims to introduce options to a price-based DR program to EV users, which can
decrease EVs’ overall charging cost and mitigate the price volatility. The proposed DR program
will comprehend EVs storage capability and flexibility in power demand, aiming to provide
flexible support during demand and supply peak periods. This research targets the Ontario
electricity market and EVs users, specifically those willing to participate in the DR program. The
specific research objectives of this thesis are:
i.

determine incentives for the price-based DR program through financial option;

ii.

identify how will the additional incentives from option payment affecting individual
EV users charging cost;

iii.

present a cost-benefit analysis for electric utilities based on EV’s market share.

3

1.2

Thesis Outline

There are six chapters included in this thesis. In Chapter 2, some theoretical background
related to the electricity market, DR program, and options are provided. In addition, literature
review on DR programs and option in the electricity market are also presented. Chapter 3 presents
a reduced form price forecasting model and describes the proposed DR program in detail. The data,
assumptions, and setup for the case study are included in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 analyzes the possible
outcome of the proposed DR program from both EV user and electric utility’s view. Lastly,
Chapter 6 includes conclusions and future work.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, we introduce some theoretical background on electricity markets, DR
programs and options. After discussing the status of the existing DR program, we provide a
literature review on options for the electricity market.
2.1

Electricity Market

Electricity is a commodity capable of being bought, sold, and traded in the electricity market.
In the electricity market, the clearing prices are contingent on the realized information; in other
words, the interaction among participants, including operators, producers, and wholesale
consumers, makes the pricing competitive. The electricity system operators forecast the expected
demand for the days ahead. With the forecast demand, the day-ahead price is primarily determined
by matching offers from producers to bids from wholesale consumers based on the least-cost
dispatch principle.
A stable electricity grid requires an exactly equal power supply and demand in real-time.
However, electricity cannot be stored in an economically efficient way. Since the day-ahead
prediction errors exist, operators must address the excess/lack of electricity supplement in the realtime market, which can be achieved by bringing/dispatching generating units online/offline to meet
the real-time balance. Thus, the intra-day price, which represents the hourly wholesale price in the
real-time market, has a higher volatility than the day-ahead price. In a competitive electricity
market, when the supply shortage occurs (𝑄𝑄1 ∗ < 𝑄𝑄1 in Figure 2-1), the high start-up cost of flexible

forms of power generation causes the wholesale price inflation considerably (𝑃𝑃1 < 𝑃𝑃2 in Figure 2-

1) [10].
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Figure 2-1 Marginal cost merit order chart

Conversely, the wholesale price decreases sharply (negative pricing might occur) when the
supply peak occurs due to the high shutdown costs for the producers [11]. Negative pricing will
lead to many modelling problems, as the return of trading electricity becomes infinite when the
price approaches zero and is not defined at all for negative prices.
Moreover, seasonality has certain impacts on demand and supply that contribute to significant
electricity price fluctuation. On the demand side, the impacts on different sectors (residential,
commercial, and industrial) exhibit different seasonal variances. As shown in Figure 2-2 (data
source: [12]), demand for electricity in the residential sectors shows the largest seasonal variance,
with a range of 78 billion kWh. The residential demand curve shows a considerable rise in summer
and winter due to the temperature followed by a sharp fall in spring and fall. Further, the summer
peak is always higher than the winter peak since all air conditionings are electricity-driven, while
heaters can have various fuels, including electricity, natural gas, and fossil fuel. The demand curve
of commercial sectors is similar to the residential one but less volatile, with a range of 44 billion
kWh. For industrial sectors, the demand variance is flattest among all, reaching the peak in the
summer, approximately 90 billion kWh. There is no significant rise in demand in the winter for
6

industrial sectors.

Figure 2-2 Seasonal variations in demand

On the supply side, the generation from renewable energy sources is also greatly affected by
seasonal patterns. In Figure 2-3 (data source: [12]), the performance of wind and hydropower plants
usually reaches the highest in spring and hits the lowest in summer, while solar output tends to be
highest during the summer. In spring, the melting snow and precipitation provide extra water flow
for hydropower plants; thus, the increased hydroelectric output can help offset prices. Solar
generators produce less electricity in winter since less daytime and weaker radiation on panels.
The generation from wind and solar show a noticeable rise compares with the previous year’s
generation indicating that the generation capacity is increasing gradually.
In addition to cleaning trades in the day-ahead market and the real-time market, the operators
are also responsible for scheduling operating reserve load for any unexpected mismatch between
generation and load through ancillary services markets (also known as operating reserve market,
7

capacity market). For those producers offering operating reserves, they are required to provide a
certain amount of energy within the time frame. Market operators can adjust the operating capacity
based on their forecasting of peak load. In return for offering operating reserves, producers are
rewarded for the installed capacity at the market-clearing price when the operating reserve is
activated. With proper scheduling of real-time market, day-ahead market, and operating reserve
markets, operators can ensure the grid providing reliable service efficiently and economically.

Figure 2-3 Seasonal variations in supply

When low-priced electricity is transmitted to another grid, there might be insufficient
transmission capacity to support the flow since the grid is becoming overloaded, known as
congestion. The transmission congestion cost represents the net cost of the replacement power
supplied by other types when the electricity transactions cannot be physically implemented as
requested [13]. The congestion cost is charged under locational marginal pricing (also known as
nodal pricing) in the North American electricity markets, which evaluated the marginal cost based
on where the power is received or delivered. In contrast, European electricity markets do not charge
8

additional fees within the same zone.
2.2

DR Program

From the electric utilities’ perspective, DR programs have been considered a cost-effective
resource to reduce the power system peak and defer the need to increase the generating capacity.
Thus, electricity utilities have strong motivation to introduce or expand the DR programs,
including incentive-based programs and price-based programs, to their targeted customers. The
valuation of the DR programs can be estimated from cost-saving aspects: generation capacity cost,
transmission cost, ancillary services costs, energy cost, and so on [14]. From customers'
perspectives, the major benefit of participating in DR programs is the significant savings on the
electricity bills. Therefore, the charging cost-saving can directly measure the intrinsic value for
customers shifting their consumption periods.
Some literature papers or electric utilities named incentive-based and price-based programs
as system-based and market-led-based, emergency-based and economic-based, or stability-based
and economic-based DR programs [5]; in fact, they refer to the similar DR content in different
names. The main difference between incentive-based programs and price-based programs is:
customers enrolled in incentive-based programs are offered certain incentives to deliver a predefined amount of load reduction over a given period, while customers enrolled in price-based
programs voluntarily reduce or shift their load when economic signals occur [15].
2.2.1 Incentive-based DR
Incentive-based DR is further classified into two categories: Classical Incentive-based DR
and Market-based Incentive-based DR. Usually, there is a specific curtailment requirement to
participate in Incentive-based DR programs; for example, New York Independent System
9

Operator (NYISO) set up a minimum 100 kW load reduction requirement for its Incentive-based
DR programs, which is difficult for an individual or small business customers to reach the baseline.
Classical Incentive-based DR includes Direct Load Control programs and Curtailable Load
programs, which provides participating customers discount or credit on the electricity bill [5]. In
Direct Load Control programs, electric utilities can remotely control participants’ appliances, such
as air conditioners and water heaters. When economic or reliability events are triggered, they can
shut down the controlled devices on short notice without compromising the end user's comfort.
Participants in Curtailable Load programs are required to reduce their load to pre-defined values
when requested. Penalties will be charged when failure to respond to load reduction requests.
Market-based Incentive-based DR includes Demand Bidding, Emergency DR, Ancillary
Services Bidding. Demand Bidding program allows participants to submit bids, including clearing
prices and load reduction quantities. Once accepted the bids, participants receive payments after
satisfying their capacity reduction obligations. On the other hand, Emergency DR provides a high
incentive payment to customers who voluntarily reduce their electricity usage during emergency
conditions [16]. Ancillary Services Market allows customers to bid on load curtailment in the spot
market as an operating reserve, which helps ensure the reliable operation of the power system
easing the renewable energy integration [5].
2.2.2 Price-based DR
In Price-based DR programs, customers have opportunities to reduce or shift their electricity
usage in response to different time-based rates. Time of use (TOU) pricing, Real-time pricing
(RTP), and Critical peak pricing (CPP) are Price-based DR programs that are currently wildly
accepted.
10

Time of use (TOU) pricing: Residents or small business consumers pay TOU prices facing
on-peak, mid-peak, and off-peak charges that reflect the cost of generating electricity at different
times of the day. Customers in the TOU program usually face a much higher price at the on-peak
period (e.g., 9 A.M.-7 P.M. on weekdays), while the price is the cheapest at the off-peak period
(e.g., 7 P.M.- the second day 7 A.M. on weekdays). In Ontario, the Ontario Energy Board (OEB)
sets the electricity rates and on-peak period, which fluctuate during the summer and wintertime.
Since the TOU adjustment frequency is twice annually, the main drawback of TOU pricing is
unable to capture the hourly variation in the demand and supply; thus, there is limited support in
the integration of renewable energy sources [17]. Most Ontario residents are currently enrolled in
TOU pricing; hence, TOU pricing can be treated as the baseline when comparing the charging cost
under other Price-based DR programs. Under TOU pricing, the best strategy for EV users to
minimize the electricity bill is to shift the entire charging process to off-peak hours.

min ZTOU = 𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

(2-1)

Where: 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the total cost of charging under TOU, in the unit of dollar. 𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is the hourly off-

peak electricity rate, in dollars/kWh, 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is the total charging time, in the unit of hour, and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
represents the EVs charging power, in the unit of kW.

Real-time pricing (RTP): Customers who participate in RTP are charged the real-time
electricity price on an hourly basis. Due to a shorter adjusting period, RTP reflects the cost of
producing electricity based on supply and demand more accurately than TOU pricing. Although
the target clients of RTP pricing are large businesses, Boisvert et al.’s study [18] indicated that
individual customers, who are involved in the New York wholesale market, have also exerted some
downward pressure on market prices and price volatility. Under the RTP program, the cost of
11

purchasing electricity during the supply peak can be significantly decreased since the real-time
electricity rate can be zero or even negative. For example, the wholesale electricity rate in Ontario
at 7–8 A.M. on 13 April, 2019, is 0 cent per kWh, and it drops below zero on the same day, which
is -1.32 cents per kWh between 10–11 A.M. By subscribing to the RTP program, the real-time
electricity rate can be a signal for consumers shifting their energy demand to meet the supply peak,
which can contribute to integrate renewable energy sources into the power system. Due to price
uncertainty in RTP, customers must rely on historical or forecast electricity prices to schedule their
usages [19]. Also, to avoid the dramatic high energy price, the EVs users must keep monitoring
the hourly-ahead price through certain smart technology when charging the EVs. Thus, some
individuals may be unwilling to commit to making the desired demand reductions without
assurances regarding future price levels beyond the current price interval [20]. Under RTP, the
minimum cost of charging EV can be expressed as:

𝑛𝑛

min 𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = � 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

(2-2)

𝑖𝑖=1

Where: 𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2 + ··· + 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 = 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏1 = 𝑏𝑏2 = ··· = 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 =1, 0 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ≤ 1

For the charging period, the EV’s battery is charged at equal fractions from 𝑡𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑛𝑛 −
1 hour, and 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 is the remaining hours of the battery be fully charged after 𝑛𝑛 − 1 hours, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the

real-time electricity rate at hour 𝑛𝑛, in dollars/kWh, and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 represents the EVs charging power,
in the unit of kW.
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Critical peak pricing (CPP): CPP programs usually start with a TOU rate structure; however,
the electricity utilities can inflate the unit price to a critical peak rate with notice in CPP events
[21]. Participating customers will receive a day-ahead notification when CPP events are triggered.
CPP events are most likely to occur when extremely hot/cold weather prompts; moreover, the
annual occurrence of CPP has a specific limit, and it will not be called more than once per day.
Wolak pointed out that CPP is particularly effective when the occurrence of the high wholesale
price is limited to about 75-100 hours of the year [22]. However, the CPP special rate is determined
in advance. There will be a limited effect on peak load reduction when the wholesale market prices
are much higher than the CPP special rate.
2.2.3 DR current status
At the current stage of DR program development, industrial sectors contribute about 50
percent of peak load reduction; meanwhile, an increasing number of residential sectors are
participating in peak load reduction [23].
Most industrial sectors are extensive energy consumers with regular load profiles, which can
provide various DR opportunities for the electricity grid. They are sensitive to the marginal cost
of production, which increases their wiliness in participating DR program. In return for the
financial incentive, industrial sectors can take advantage of interruptible service contracts to reduce
electricity consumption when responding to incentive-based DR program requests. However,
some industrial customers resist participating in DR programs. When shifting the load from peak
to off-peak period, there will be additional labour and administrative burden. For a small business,
the financial incentives received might not be enough to cover the extra cost. Moreover,
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manufacturers who have high requirements on product quality cannot accept the potential risk of
negative impacts of DR [24].
Compared with industrial sectors, residential sectors make a modest contribution to peak load
reduction through a price-based program. Through promotion on the media, more individuals are
informed about the importance and opportunities of demand response, increasing their willingness
to participate in available DR programs. Although the contribution from industrial sectors keeps
rising, there are still some barriers existing for popularizing DR. Since there is a limited amount
of flexible residential load (up to 10 kW), much researches focus on refrigeration appliances [25],
air conditioning or heating [26]. Some individuals complain that the monthly return from shifting
demand to off-peak hours for a house is not significant; therefore, they tend not to adjust their
electricity consumption which reduces their comfort during demand peaks. In electricity grid
operators’ view, each individual's contribution is too small and uncontrollable; further, there is no
guarantee on peak load reduction. It will require an aggregator integrating the numerous and
dispersed residential customers for better energy efficiency. Although the contribution from
industrial sectors keeps increasing, there is still a great potential in peak load reduction with
overcoming the existing barriers.
2.3

Options

According to [27], electricity producers can hedge their financial risk of production through
trading electricity options in the market. There are two types of options: call and put. A call option
is a contract that allows the contract holder to have the right to buy a specified amount of assets
by a specified date at a fixed price, while a put option allows having the right to sell a specified
amount of assets. The specified date is the expiration date or maturity date, and the fixed price is

14

called the strike price or exercise price. A European option refers to the option that can only be
exercised at the maturity date. In American options, the holders can exercise the option at any time
before the expiration date, i.e., American options holders can lock in their profit in advance as
soon as the price fluctuates favourably. Bermuda options are a specified form of American options,
which can be exercised early but only on a set of specific times before its expiration.
Like a contract between two parties, an option always has a buyer and a seller. The seller of
an option is obligated to buy (with puts) or sell (with calls) the underlying asset when the buyer
decides to exercise the option. The buyer has the right but not obligation to exercise the option: to
buy (with calls) or sell (with puts) the underlying asset at the strike price. It is similar to future or
forward contracts, which involve an agreement on having obligation buy or sell on underlying
asset at a future date.
Options contracts have two benefits compared with future contracts or forward contracts. First,
option holders can use option leverage to grow their portfolios in a flexible way. For instance, the
cost of one future contract to purchase 100 shares of the underlying stock is $5000 (= 100 × 50),

and a call option is asking for $2 securing 100 shares of the underlying stock with a strike price at

$50. The investor can purchase either 200 shares with $10000 or purchase 5000 contracts of $50
strike call options of the stock, which controls 50000 shares. With the leverage effect, the investor
gains 25 times of payoff from stock using the same investment.
Second, options can also be used to reduce the risk in the market. Consider an investor
purchase 100 shares of stock. The stock's current price is $20, and a put option that can be
maturated within one year with the strike price of $12 for 100 shares of stock is $2. If the stock
price drops to $10 after one year, the investor can sell the stocks at $12 by exercising the put option.
15

Even if the stock price decreases below $10, the value of the investor’ s holding is always above
$1200 (= 100 × 12), shown in Figure 2-5.

Figure 2-4 Value of the stock holding in a year with and without hedging

2.3.1 Black-Scholes-Merton model
Black and Scholes [28] developed the Black-Scholes model for pricing an option contract; in
particular, the model estimates the theoretical value of European options that can only be exercised
at the expiration date. It assumes that the markets are efficient and the returns on the underlying
asset are log-normally distributed. Besides, there is no transaction cost purchasing the option, and
no dividends are paid. The Black-Scholes model can be utilized to determine the value of a
European-style call/put option with five input variables: the strike price of an option 𝐾𝐾, the current
16

stock price 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 , the time to expiration 𝑇𝑇, the risk-free rate 𝑟𝑟, and the volatility 𝜎𝜎. The value of a call
option (𝐶𝐶) / put option (𝑃𝑃) for a non-dividend-paying underlying stock [28]:
𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑1 ) − 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑2 )
𝑃𝑃 = 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑2 ) − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑1 )
𝑑𝑑1 =

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼

𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎 2
+ (𝑟𝑟 + )𝑇𝑇
𝐾𝐾
2
𝜎𝜎√𝑡𝑡

𝑑𝑑2 = 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝜎𝜎√𝑡𝑡

(2-3)
(2-4)

(2-5)

(2-6)

N(𝑥𝑥) denote the standard normal probability density function,

2.3.2 Risk neutral

𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) =

1

√2𝜋𝜋

−𝑥𝑥 2
𝑒𝑒 2

(2-7)

Without a future/forward contract, the stock price keeps fluctuating under the real-world
probability measure 𝑃𝑃� that greatly impacts the return. When investors calculate the expected

value of discounted cash flow at 𝑡𝑡 = 0, the investor's discount risk rates vary on their risk aversion.
Risk premium rather than risk-free interest is required to compensate for the extra risk exposed for

risk-averse investors, but a precise premium is hard to quantify. An alternative way is to replicate
the portfolio under a no-arbitrage case. The fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that if
markets are arbitrage-free and complete, then there exists a risk-neutral measure 𝑄𝑄� and it is unique
[29].
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Assume a stock S with the initial price is 𝑆𝑆0 , the probability of price inflation 𝑆𝑆1 = 𝑆𝑆0 ⋅ 𝑢𝑢 is

𝑝𝑝 and the probability of price inflation 𝑆𝑆1 = 𝑆𝑆0 ⋅ 𝑑𝑑 is (1 − 𝑝𝑝), with restriction 𝑑𝑑 < 1 + 𝑟𝑟 < 𝑢𝑢.
𝑆𝑆0 = 𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄� �

𝑆𝑆1

(1+𝑟𝑟)1

|𝐹𝐹(0)� =

1

(1+𝑟𝑟)

�𝑆𝑆0 ⋅ 𝑢𝑢 ⋅ 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑆𝑆0 ⋅ 𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (1 − 𝑝𝑝)�

From (2-6), 𝑝𝑝 =

(2-6)

1+𝑟𝑟−𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢−𝑑𝑑

By replicating the portfolio with the risk-neutral measure 𝑄𝑄�, the expected value of discounted

cash flow at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 is quantified without considering the impacts of risk-aversion and the real-

world probability measure 𝑃𝑃�.

2.3.3 Overview of options for the electricity market

The traditional options for common derivatives do not consider the unique features of
electricity, in particular the non-storability, which introduces the possibility of arbitrage. Thus,
there is much research related to options in the electricity market. Sezgen et al. [30] adapted the
Black-Scholes model to value demand response strategies, including load curtailment, load
shifting, and short-term fuel substitution. However, the study assumed that customers have prior
day notice on hourly electricity prices, which neglects the price fluctuation between the day-ahead
market and the real-time market. Kamat and Oren proposed exotic call options that have two
exercise points with different strike prices [31], which improve energy efficiency and hedge the
curtailment risk. Also, the pricing of options follows the canonical Geometric Brownian Motion.
Therefore, the volatility from price spike caused by extreme imbalance can contribute significantly
to option prices; in other words, it is not suitable for the electricity market with high renewable
energy shares due to high cost. Kluge explored pricing a swing option, which allows holders to
exercise the call/put option multiple times over a specified period but only once at a time [32]. To
18

avoid high uncertainties of the spot price over long time periods (1000 days in the paper), Kluge
constructed a stochastic spot price model with the spike process. The main limitation is that higher
exercise times increase the computational burden preventing it be used practically [33].
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CHAPTER 3
3.1

METHODOLOGY

Price Forecasting

Unlike other commodities, electricity cannot be stored efficiently like conventional fossil fuels,
which need to balance production and consumption all the time, i.e., the relation between
production and consumption is unrelated to the price signal, which is called inelasticity. Kluge [32]
indicated that the inelasticity of demand and supply makes electricity prices very sensitive to
extreme events. When the penetration of renewable energy in the power grid increases, the
electricity price will be more volatile due to the uncertainty and intermittency of renewable energy
resources. Therefore, it is essential to construct a price forecasting model for the electricity market
so that the theoretical payoff of options can be accurately valued, and the electricity facilities can
incorporate them into their DR strategies.
There are two different ways to estimate the future price in the market. One is to determine
the day-ahead market price through matching bidding offers at the supply and demand equilibrium
price, which is used by the electricity producers. However, such an approach requires a large
amount of accurate data on bidding offers and a clear understanding of the market mechanisms.
The second approach is based on historical data with statistical techniques. This research will
follow the second approach to forecast the day-ahead electricity price since the statistical methods
can better understand the impact of exogenous factors, such as total consumption and renewable
energy supplements.
Reduced-form (quantitative, stochastic) models focus on capturing the main properties of
electricity prices; thus, these types of models are mainly based on an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process,
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which represents a modification of the random walk-in continuous-time having a tendency back
to a central location. In other words, the models have the property of mean-reverting.
Lucia and Schwartz [34] first proposed a stochastic spot price model that the spot price 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 of

electricity at time 𝑡𝑡 is the exponential of an OU process 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 and a seasonal component 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡).
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = −𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 )

(3-1)

𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀

Where: 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 represents a standard Brownian motion, 𝜀𝜀 is a distributed standard normal distribution

𝑁𝑁~ (0,1), 𝛼𝛼 is the volatility parameter, and 𝜎𝜎 is the speed of mean reversion. The model has the

advantage that it is straightforward for researchers to get the main trend of the price curve. Also,
the spot price is log-normal distributed, making it ideal for the Black-Scholes model in option
pricing. Although the seasonality of the electricity price has been considered, it has the limitation
of ignoring the price spikes, which reflects some extreme price occurrence.
Later, Kluge [32] introduced price spike to Lucia and Schwartz’s stochastic spot price model
so that the two-factor jump-diffusion model will be able to describe the price jump existing in the
European electricity market without losing its simplicity.

𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 )
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = −𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
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(3-2)

𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = −𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡

Where 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 represents the price jump, 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 is a Poisson process and 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 is an independent identically
distributed (iid) process representing the jump size. Furthermore, 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 , 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 and 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 are mutually
independent.

However, both price spikes and negative price spikes exist in Ontario electricity market. The
traditional log-price forecasting is not suitable for negative electricity prices; hence, models for
forecasting Ontario electricity market prices will be stated in price level rather than logtransformation price. For the seasonal pattern, we follow Seifert and Uhrig-Homburg’s work [35]
by adding sinusoidal and indicator functions to model the seasonal patterns. The stochastic model
can be expressed as:

𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡

𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑆𝑆1 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(2𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋) + 𝑆𝑆2 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(2𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋) + 𝑆𝑆3 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(4𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋) + 𝑆𝑆4 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(4𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋) + 𝑆𝑆5

(3-3)

𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = (𝛼𝛼 − 𝜅𝜅𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡

Where 𝑡𝑡 is the annualized time factors, 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜅𝜅 are the parameters of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck

process, 𝜎𝜎 is the volatility parameter. Similar to Kluge’s model, the price jump is captured by the
Poisson process, 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 , with jump intensity λ.

Having the seasonal component removed, the stochastic part of the price process 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 can be further

discretized to normal price process with probability (1 − λ∆𝑡𝑡) and price jump process with
probability (λ∆𝑡𝑡).
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𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = �

𝛼𝛼∆𝑡𝑡 + ∅𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎,
𝛼𝛼∆𝑡𝑡 + ∅𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 + 𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽 𝜉𝜉𝐽𝐽 ,

∅ = 1 − 𝜅𝜅∆𝑡𝑡

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 (1 − λ∆𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 (λ∆𝑡𝑡)

(3-4)

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝜅𝜅 > 0, ∅ < 1, 0 < 𝜆𝜆∆𝑡𝑡 < 1

Where: 𝜉𝜉 and 𝜉𝜉𝐽𝐽 are independent standard normal random variables. ∅ is a speed measurement of

converging to the average, when 𝜅𝜅 is relatively small, ∅ is approximately equal to 1, which implies

a slow mean-reversion process. Furthermore, 0 < λ∆𝑡𝑡 < 1 limits the occurrence of the price spike.
𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 |𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 ) = (λ∆𝑡𝑡) 𝑁𝑁1 (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 |𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 ) + (1 − λ∆𝑡𝑡) 𝑁𝑁2 (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 |𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 )
2

𝑁𝑁1 (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 |𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 ) = (2𝜋𝜋�𝜎𝜎 +

1
−�𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽 �)−2 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �
2

1

𝑁𝑁2 (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 |𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 ) = (2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎 2 )−2 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �

3.2

− 𝛼𝛼∆𝑡𝑡 − ∅𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽 �
2�𝜎𝜎 2 + 𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽 2 �

2

�

(3-5)

−(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼∆𝑡𝑡 − ∅𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 )2
�
2𝜎𝜎 2

Proposed Option Model

The proposed DR program is incentivized with options to EV users under the real-time
electricity rate. In such a DR program, electricity utilities, as hedgers, avoid the risk that they will
be exposed from potential future movements of electricity unit price. On the other hand, EVs users
wish to take the risk to gain the financial benefits when participating in the proposed DR program,
i.e., they provide the charging flexibility to electric utilities as dispatchable capacity into the grid.
When the DR events are triggered, electricity utilities will send out requests through exercising
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option. EV users will follow the DR requests to charge or stop charging their EVs during the DR
event. In return, EV users are rewarded with the option payment.
3.2.1 Put Option
The research starts with a Bermuda-style put option in the real-time electricity market to be
more specific about the proposed DR program. Electric utilities purchase a put option 24 hours in
advance based on the day-ahead forecasting prices that allow them to sell a certain amount of
electricity at the strike price during the delivery period, as illustrated in Figures 3-1. Bermuda
options can be exercised early but only at a set of specific times (hour i = 1, 2, … , 24) before its

expiration. The expiration time of the Bermuda-style put option, 𝑇𝑇, is at the end of the day (i =
24).

1. Exercise based on price
Forecast day-ahead price

IF: Option is not exercised

FALSE
FALSE

Unit price=
Real-time price

TRUE

Purchase put option

IF: Real time price < Strike price

TRUE

Exercise put option
Unit price=
Strike price

2. Timeline
Day-ahead

Day Ahead Market

Intra-day

Real Time Market

Intra-hour

Dispatch
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Figure 3-1 Timeline for pricing the electricity price in the proposed DR (put option only)

Since renewable energy resources have great uncertainty and intermittency, significant deviations
in supply might exist between day-ahead scheduling and real-time delivery of electricity. At the
time of maturity (1 hour before physical delivery), the demand peak occurs, causing the price
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inflation, then the producers choose to sell the electricity without exercising the option; meanwhile,
the consumers receive the price increment signal so that they can decrease their energy demand to
reduce the bill. Another scenario at the time of maturity is that the supply peak arises instead of
the demand peak. It is expected that electric utilities exercise the option during the supply peak
period. In that case, the consumers will follow the dispatching request to consume electricity at
the supply peak. The consumers receive the financial benefit from the option fee payment paid by
the producers, whether the put option is exercised or not. Electricity utilities can hedge the price
and production-availability risks with a properly constructed put option combined with RTP, while
the customers can get appropriate incentives from the option payment 𝑃𝑃 and lower risk involving
the real-time market. The minimum cost of charging EV, 𝑍𝑍𝑂𝑂 , becomes:

(3-6)

𝑛𝑛

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑍𝑍𝑂𝑂 = � 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃
𝑖𝑖=1

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝐾𝐾) 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = �
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(3-7)

Where: 𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2 + ··· + 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 = 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏1 = 𝑏𝑏2 = ··· = 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 =1, 0 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ≤ 1

Similar to RTP, the EV is charged at equal fractions until t = 𝑛𝑛 − 1 hour, 𝐾𝐾 is the pre-defined

electricity rate (strike price) through the put option, and 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛 represents the actual electricity rate
paid by EV customers at hour 𝑛𝑛. The strike price is determined by the 𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 percentile of the

wholesale electricity price in the last 168（=7 × 24） hours. If the put option is not exercised, and
the real-time electricity rate 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 is below the strike price 𝐾𝐾, electric utilities can exercise the option
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of selling the electricity at the strike price K ; oppositely, if the real-time electricity rate 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 is above

the strike price K, or the put option is already exercised, the real-time electricity rate becomes the
electricity hourly wholesale price 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 . The put option will automatically expire at the end of the

day, even if not be exercised. When exercising the put option, the unit price might be relatively
high, which the put option payment cannot fully compensate; thus, EV users receive a financial
loss in a DR event when the wholesale electricity price drops below the strike price sharply.
The Bermuda-style put option allows its holder to exercise the option at any time before the
expiration time, which increases the difficulty in estimating the theoretical value of the put option.
Start with the electric utilities’ payoff from exercising the put option at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡).
𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡) = (𝐾𝐾 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 )+

(3-8)

Assuming the optimum exercising time is 𝜏𝜏 ∗ , then the discount cash flow at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 can be expressed
∗
as: 𝐸𝐸�𝑄𝑄 �e−r𝜏𝜏 𝑔𝑔(𝜏𝜏 ∗ )�. However, 𝜏𝜏 ∗ is unknown in practical; instead, the actual discount cash flow

at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 is: sup 𝐸𝐸�𝑄𝑄 [e−r𝜏𝜏 𝑔𝑔(𝜏𝜏)]
𝜏𝜏∈[0,𝑇𝑇]

In the proposed DR program, the put option can only be exercised at hour i , so that
electric utilities can charge EV users the corresponding wholesale electricity rate directly,
where i = 1, 2, … , 𝑇𝑇. Assuming the option is not exercised at hour i. Bensoussan indicated
that the value of an American option could be represented by the Snell envelope [36]:

𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑔𝑔(𝑖𝑖)
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(3-9)

�[𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖)|𝐹𝐹(𝑖𝑖 − 1)]�
𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖 − 1) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑥𝑥), 𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟∙1 E

(3-10)

𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) is the theoretical value of an option in the market at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖. 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑥𝑥) is the payoff from

�[𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖)|𝐹𝐹(𝑖𝑖 − 1)] is the discounted cash flow of expected
exercising option at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖 − 1, e−r∙1 E

payoff from continuation at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖 − 1 with information set 𝐹𝐹(𝑖𝑖 − 1). For each time interval,

the holder needs to choose between exercising or holding the option based on the value at the
corresponding period. If the payoff, 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑥𝑥) is larger than the discounted cash flow of the
�[𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖)|𝐹𝐹(𝑖𝑖 − 1)] , the holder will exercise the option to lock in profits and vice
option, e−r∙1 E
versa. Repeating the process until 𝑖𝑖 − 1 = 0 provides the initial theoretical value of an
American put option.

In [37], the Least-Squares method is proposed to estimate the continuation values from
simulated sample paths for fast converge results. With a set of n simulated paths 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 under

risk neutral measure 𝑄𝑄� ∶ (S(𝑡𝑡1 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ), S(𝑡𝑡2 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ), . . . , S(𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 )), k= 1, 2, . . ., n
At terminal notes that the put option will expire, adapting from (3-9)

𝑉𝑉� (𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ) = 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 )

(3-11)

Similar to (3-11), for each time interval backward 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚 − 1, . . . ,2,1, holder need to

evaluate if the return of exercising the option, 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ), is greater than the continuation value,

𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ).

𝑉𝑉� (𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚−1 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ), 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 )}
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(3-12)

𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ) ≈ 𝛼𝛼0 𝐿𝐿0 (𝑥𝑥) + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐿𝐿1 (𝑥𝑥) + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐿𝐿2 𝑥𝑥
𝐿𝐿0 (𝑥𝑥) =exp(−𝑥𝑥/2)

𝐿𝐿1 (𝑥𝑥) =exp(−𝑥𝑥/2)(1 − 𝑥𝑥)

𝐿𝐿1 (𝑥𝑥) =exp(−𝑥𝑥/2)(1 − 2𝑥𝑥 + 𝑥𝑥 2 )

(3-13)
(3-14)
(3-15)
(3-16)

The initial theoretical value of the put option is given by:

𝑛𝑛

1
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑉𝑉� (0) = � 𝑉𝑉� (𝑡𝑡1 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 )
𝑛𝑛

LSM Algorithm [37] [38]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

𝑘𝑘=1

Initiate n paths S(𝑡𝑡1 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ), S(𝑡𝑡2 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ), . . . , S(𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 , 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 )), k= 1, 2, . . ., n
Set 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 )

for t from 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚−1 to 𝑡𝑡1

Find itm paths from {𝜔𝜔1 , 𝜔𝜔2 ,. . ., 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 } s.t. 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ) > 0

Perform regression on S(𝑡𝑡, 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ), 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖 to obtain coefficients 𝛼𝛼0 , 𝛼𝛼1 , 𝛼𝛼2
Continuation value: 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ) ≈ 𝛼𝛼0 𝐿𝐿0 (𝑥𝑥) + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐿𝐿1 (𝑥𝑥) + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐿𝐿2 𝑥𝑥
Exercising option payoff: 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ) = (𝐾𝐾 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 ))+

for i ∈ itm paths for i from 1 to n
if 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ) > 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 )

𝑃𝑃�i = 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘 )

else Pi = e−r∙1 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖

12

end if

13

end for
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(3-17)

14

end for

15

𝑃𝑃�(0) =

𝑛𝑛

1
� e−r∙1 𝑃𝑃�1
𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=1

3.2.2 Call Option
In section 3.3.1, the put option which requests EVs users to charge their EVs during the supply
peak can achieve the valley filling (the addition of loads to an electric power system in offpeak periods [39]); however, the put option has limited effects on shaving loads during on-peak
periods. At the demand peak, electric utilities raise the hourly electricity price to a higher level
than off-peak periods; as a result, customers will voluntarily postpone their charging schedule after
evaluating the cost and the urgency of charging. The voluntary demand reduction introduces
uncertainty in electric utilities’ decision-making since there is no guaranteed amount of shaving
loads. Therefore, we introduce a call option to our proposed DR program (section 3.3.1). The call
option that limits EV users’ charging behaviours during the demand peak achieves peak shaving
for the power system; meanwhile, electric utilities can obtain the information of guaranteed load
reduction before the decision process. In return for load reduction, less reserved fossil energy is
required, which helps optimize the grid operation and increase energy efficiency. Figures 3-2
illustrate that electric utilities purchase a Bermuda-style call option 24 hours in advance based on
the day-ahead forecasting to receive mandatory load reduction from EV users. The call option is
worth 𝐶𝐶, which expires at the end of the day (i = 24). The Bermuda call option allows electric
utilities early exercise at a pre-defined period (hour i = 1, 2, … , 24). The strike price of the call

option is determined by the 𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 percentile of HOEP in the last 168 (=7 × 24) hours. The holders
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of the call option, electric utilities, can exercise the call option when the real-time electricity price
𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 at hour 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑛𝑛 is above the strike price K.
1. Exercise based on price
Forecast day-ahead price

IF: Option is not exercised

FALSE

Unit price=
Real-time price

TRUE
IF: Real time price < Strike price
of put option

Purchase put and call
options

FALSE
IF: Real time price > Strike
price of call option

TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Exercise put option
Unit price =
Strike price of put option
Exercise call option
Stop charging

2. Timeline
Day-ahead

Day Ahead Market

Intra-day

Real Time Market

Intra-hour

Dispatch

22

Figure 3-2 Timeline for pricing the electricity price in the proposed DR (put option and call option)

By exercising the option, electric utilities can send out a DR event request to receive electricity
load reduction. Correspondingly, EV users charging their EVs will follow the DR event request to
stop charging and receive the financial incentives from the call option payment 𝐶𝐶. After the hour

𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇, the call option will automatically expire regardless of whether it is exercised, and EV users
can continue to charge their EVs without worrying about responding to any DR request.

A Bermudan option is a restricted form of the American option since it can be exercised in
advance at times specified in the contract. When the American option exercise period is
equivalently separated, such a contract can be treated as a Bermudan option with an infinite set of
the exercise period. Therefore, pricing a Bermudan call option can be approached by pricing an
American call option. Fahria approached the Bermudan call option through the binomial tree
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method [40]. The numerical result shows that the value of the Bermudan call option will be equal
to the value of the American option call value. Assume an American call option 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡, 𝑇𝑇) with a

strike price 𝐾𝐾 , which can be exercised from time 𝑡𝑡 to 𝑇𝑇. There is no dividend payment for the
trading asset, and the risk-free interest rate is greater than zero.
The investment portfolio is 𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡, 𝑇𝑇) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡, 𝑇𝑇) + 𝐾𝐾 .

Scenario 1: The holder exercises the call option before the maturity date 𝑇𝑇

The portfolio of early exercise American call option at time 𝑇𝑇 becomes 𝑉𝑉(𝑇𝑇, 𝑇𝑇) = 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 ;

Scenario 2: The holder does not exercise the call option in advance; instead, he made

his final decision on the option maturity date 𝑇𝑇
1)

2)

The asset price at 𝑇𝑇 is below the strike price ( 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 < 𝐾𝐾),

𝑉𝑉(𝑇𝑇, 𝑇𝑇) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇, 𝑇𝑇) + 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡) = 0 + 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡) > 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇

The asset price at 𝑇𝑇 inflates above the strike price ( 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 > 𝐾𝐾),

𝑉𝑉(𝑇𝑇, 𝑇𝑇) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇, 𝑇𝑇) + 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡) = 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 − 𝐾𝐾 + 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡) = 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 + 𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡) ) > 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇

Shreve provides a mathematic form proof with a conclusion that the price of the American
derivative security agrees with the cost of the European security [41]:
For convex function: 𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ) = (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝐾𝐾)+ , 0≤ 𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇, 0≤ 𝜆𝜆 ≤ 1 and 0≤ 𝑆𝑆1 ≤ 𝑆𝑆2 .
𝐶𝐶((1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑆𝑆1 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆2 ) ≤ (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆1 ) + 𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆2 )

Let 𝑆𝑆1 = 0, 𝑆𝑆2 = 𝑆𝑆 then (3-18) becomes
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(3-18)

𝐶𝐶(𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆) ≤ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆)

(3-19)

Substitute 𝜆𝜆 = 𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢) to (3-19)
𝐸𝐸� �𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢) 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)� ≤ 𝐸𝐸� �𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢) 𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)�

(3-20)

The conditional Jensen’s inequality implies on (3-20)
𝐶𝐶�𝐸𝐸� �(𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢) 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)�� ≤ 𝐸𝐸� �𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢) 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)�

(3-21)

Under the risk-neutral probability measure 𝑄𝑄�, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = E� [𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇 |𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)]
��(𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢) 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)�� = 𝐶𝐶�𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 E
�[(𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)]�
𝐶𝐶�E

(3-22)

= 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆(𝑢𝑢))) = 𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆(𝑢𝑢)�

Combine (3-21) (3-22)

��𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢) 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)�
𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆(𝑢𝑢)� ≤ E

(3-23)

Replace 𝑡𝑡 by 𝑇𝑇, for 0 ≤ 𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑇𝑇
��𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒 −𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑢𝑢) 𝑆𝑆(𝑇𝑇))|𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢)�
𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆(𝑢𝑢)� ≤ E

(3-24)

Therefore, for an American call option, it will not be optimal to exercise early. In other words,
pricing an American call option can be determined by a European call option with the same
exercise date and expiration date, which is the same as equation (2-4).
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CHAPTER 4
4.1

PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT

Objectives

The research aims to construct proper call/put options for EVs users under RTP. The
electricity utilities can dynamically optimize electric grid operations without increasing the price
volatility; meanwhile, EVs users can reduce their charging cost by enrolling in such a DR program.
The scope of this research is limited to Ontario EV users and Ontario’s electricity market. In
addition, the growth rates of EVs are evaluated based on the data in the past 5-year period (from
2015 to 2019). In this research, load shifting by EV customers is regarded as a particular type of
DR resource that electric utilities are willing to purchase through options in the electricity market.
In return, electricity utilities can exercise the option to require EVs customers to change their
usages when facing sudden demand/supply peak (price fluctuate drastically). From EV customers’
perspective, the total charging cost will be reduced when participating in such a DR program.
4.2

Assumptions

a) In the real world, the consumers’ purchasing power of one dollar is not exactly the same
every year. For example, the current year-over-year inflation rate (2020 to 2021) is 0.5%, which
means today’s $100 equals $100.5 in purchasing power for one year later. In this research, we use
the nominal dollar, which represents purchasing power as observed in the year rather than
inflation-adjusted dollars, i.e., the purchasing power of one dollar in 2019 is the same as one dollar
in 2015.

33

Figure 4-1 Consumer Price Index year-over-year percentage change

b) No friction exists when purchasing electricity in the market. The transmission congestion
will not charge extra cost and neglects energy loss existing when distributing electricity from
generators to customers.
c) According to [33], we assume that the daily commute distance of EVs is 35 KM/day that
requires 1.62 hours of charging every day, and the charging power is 6.6 kW. The charging process
is continuous within each hourly interval.
4.3

Electricity Market Data

It covers the five-year data from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2019 [42]. Figure 4-2 consists
of 43824 observations of the Hourly Ontario Energy Price (HOEP). HOEP represents the
wholesale price of electricity in the real-time market. Table 3-1 provides descriptive statistics for
the HOEP ’s historical observations.
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Figure 4-2 HOEP and 24 h moving average, January 2015 to December 2019

The 5-year mean price is 17.97, the minimum price is -67.08, and the maximum price is
1822.95, reflecting a highly right-skewed distribution that is more noticeable in the real-time
market than in the day-ahead market [43]. Usually, a data point that exceeds three times the
standard deviation of the sample is considered as an outlier representing significantly different
from other observations. The outliers, which can be detected through Table 3-1, should be replaced
with the mean of the respective week before feeding into the models.
Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics for HOEP 2015 to 2019 (Unit: cent/kWh)
Year

Observations

Mean

Max

Min

Median

Std.dev.

2015

8760

21.65

1402.4

-22.42

17.44

27.10

2016

8784

14.89

1619.6

-9.82

10.38

32.16

2017

8760

13.73

1847.51

-67.08

7.36

24.73
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2018

8760

22.44

365.64

-4.39

17.045

22.13

2019

8760

16.71

1028.52

-59.29

14.36

23.55

Due to the inelasticity characteristics of demand and supply, the electricity price becomes
sensitive to extreme events. This research explicitly defines the price spikes: HOEP is greater than
$200/MWh and resumes to a normal price level within hours. For example, on 8 P.M. 11 March
2017, the HOEP was $1,823/MWh, which is the second highest since market opening [44]. The
main reason contributing to the price spikes is that more than 400 MW of variable generation
shortfall; meanwhile, 100 MW of unpredicted demand occurs. Without enough gas and
hydroelectric generators online, there was inadequate supply to meet the energy demand, resulting
in the market-clearing price rising considerably, also known as price spike. The HOEP price drop
to $30.55 with additional import offers to the electricity market.
Another noticeable outcome in Figure 4-2 is the deep negative price on 6 A.M. 2 July 2017.
The HOEP is $-67.08/MWh. The negative pricing represents a large discrepancy between predispatch demand forecasts and real-time demand. In a competitive electricity market, the price
becomes zero or negative is an unsustainable phenomenon that only lasts for a short period and
most likely occurs at night (off-peak periods). When the negative price lasts for a long period, the
electricity market operators will adapt the flexible online generators to profitable generation
through exiting the market.
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Table 4-2: Compares the frequency distribution of the HOEP for HOEP 2015 to 2019

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

28

19

23

10

7

Normal (0<HOEP<200)

7590

6769

6050

7638

7020

Negative Spike (HOEP<=0)

1142

1996

2687

1112

1733

Sum

8760

8784

8760

8760

8760

Price Spike (HOEP>=200)

From Figure 4-2 and Table 4-2, the frequency of price spike and negative spike witnessed a
considerable increment in the 2015-2017 period; however, there is a sharp fall in 2018, and after
that, it shows a rise in negative spike but fall in price spike. As [44] mentioned, the electric utilities’
forecasting tool and procedure were not fully developed in 2016-2017. Less price spike (or
negative price spikes) occurs, indicating a higher accuracy in predicting the day-ahead electricity
market. In the 2016-2017 period, generating from coal was no longer exists in the electricity
market, and the utilization of gas-fired generation has decreased; besides, an additional 829 MW
of wind and solar generation capacity are connected to the grid [45]. In other words, renewable
energy generation, which is less flexible, takes a higher fraction in the supply. Lack of flexible
generation resources contributed to higher frequency price spikes and negative price spikes. In the
2018-2019 period, the improvement on forecasting significantly reduces the price spikes and
negative price spikes’ occurrences; nonetheless, the electricity generation from renewable
resources is increasing, causing a rise in the 2019 negative spike frequency.
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Figure 4-3 HOEP and hourly market demand (01/2015–12/2019)

Figure 4-3 provides an overview of the relationship between the HOEP and hourly market
demand, which are observed from January 2015 to December 2019. The hourly market demand is
expressed on the x-axis, and the y-axis represents the HOEP price. The black dashed-dot line is a
reference line through the least-square approach (𝑦𝑦 = 0.004979 ∙ 𝑥𝑥 − 65.931) on the scatter plot,

which shows weak, positive linear relationships between HOEP and hourly market demand. As

Figure 4-3 shown, the price spikes (HOEP>=200) are randomly distributed in the 1.5 to 2.5 MW
demand range, while the negative spikes (HOEP<0) have been found to cluster in the 1.3 to 1.4
MW demand area. The reason contributed to the phenomenon is: the variable generation increases
the uncertainty in supply, causing the supply shortfall, thereby arising the price spikes
unpredictably; on the other hand, the market demand has a strong periodic pattern: low demand
during the off-peak period represents low flexibility in adjusting demand, which contributes to the
clustering negative spikes.
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4.4

Parameters Estimation

Figure 4-4 Calibration for Seasonal Pattern

We first estimated the parameters of the deterministic seasonal part, 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡), through the least2

squares algorithm ( 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∑�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)� ). With determined seasonal function parameters, the

seasonal pattern is plotted in the red line in Figure 3-4. What’s more, the deseasonalized of price
process, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 , is plotted.

Through minimizing the negative log-likelihood function ( min ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 log( 𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 |𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 )), the set of
𝜃𝜃

parameters 𝜃𝜃 = �𝛼𝛼, 𝜅𝜅, 𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽 , 𝜎𝜎 2 , 𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽 2 , λ � can be estimated. In this research, we separated the 5-year
HOEP data into three sets: firstly, the 5-year data (1 January 2015, to 31 December 2019) is used

for model parameter estimation, and second, (1 January 2019, to 31 December 2019) is used as in
sample data. Lastly, (1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020) is used for out-of-sample validation.
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Table 4-3: Estimated parameters of the process (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 )
Parameter

Value

𝛼𝛼

11641.85

𝜅𝜅

3900.3

𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽

19.403

𝜎𝜎

746.33

𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽

14.08

λ

605.25

With the model parameters estimated (Table 4-3), we can add the seasonality back on
simulated data and compare the simulated 2019 HOEP with the observed 2019 one. As shown in
Figure 4-5, the simulated price does not only catch the general trend but also forecasts the price
spikes successfully. The mean-squared error between the actual and simulated 2019’s HOEP is
219.6540, indicating that the reduced formed price forecasting model is able to represent the main
feature of electricity market price. Additionally, Figure 4-6 performs a residual analysis on 2019’s
HOEP. It shows that the simulation on 2019 HOEP through reduced-form models has a similar
distribution to the historical data that both are unimodal and occur peak within range (15, 20).
However, the distribution of the historical data (except range (15, 20)) is relatively uniform, while
the simulated one rises/falls sharply, explaining that most errors occur within range (0,15).
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Figure 4-5 Comparison between the actual price and simulated price in 2019

Figure 4-6 Residual analysis on 2019 HOEP
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Figure 4-7 Comparison between the actual price and simulated price in 2020

Figure 4-8 Residual analysis on 2020 HOEP

Figure 4-7 illustrates an out-of-sample validation for the price forecasting model. It is not
surprising that simulated HOEP from January to May in 2021 is significantly higher than the
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historical data shown since the Covid-19 pandemic has a considerable modification to residential
or commercial electricity usage. Consequently, the change in electricity demand turns into changes
on HOEP, which is shown in Figure 4-8. The actual data on HOEP shows a positive skew that the
mass of the distribution is concentrated within the range (0, 20), while the simulated 2020 data is
symmetric with a sharp drop after the peak in (15, 20).
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CHAPTER 5
5.1

RESULTS

EV User Benefits

Based on Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, this research compares the proposed DR with call and put
option with two price-based DR programs discussed in Section 2.2.2 (TOU and RTP) through the
annual cost of charging for one EV result, which is shown in Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1 Daily Cost of EV Charging
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Table 5-1: Daily Cost of EV Charging for DR programs
Standard Error of

DR Program

Annual Cost ($)

Average Daily Cost ($)

TOU

394.2

1.080

0

RTP

410.4

1.124

1.3051

RTP with Option 1

359.3

0.984

1.2332

Daily Cost ($)

As equation (2-1) indicated, customers under TOU are charged at a fixed electricity rate regardless
of demand/supply peak; meanwhile, the daily cost of RTP and RTP with option keep fluctuating.
From Figure 5-1, in late February 2019, the daily cost of RTP is significantly higher than RTP
with option, which represents that the demand peak occurs, causing RTP increases. In such a
scenario, electric utilities exercise the put option so that EV users can shift their load from high
demand to low demand period. However, the situation is different in May that EVs customers’
payment under RTP with option pay is no significant difference to those under RTP. The main
reason contributing to the situation is that the excess wind and hydro supplements cause price
deflation. At renewable energy supply peak, electricity utilities exercise the put option to lock in
their profits when the real-time price is lower than the strike price. Therefore, the daily cost of EV
users under RTP with option increases when the demand is low. Through purchasing the put option,
electricity utilities avoid the potential losses due to the excess renewable energy supply and keep
most of the benefits from high market-clearing prices.

The strike price is set as 5th percentile of HOEP in the last 168 hours for put option, and 95th percentile for call
option

1
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Table 5-1 reveals that EV customers receiving the option incentives have lower annual costs than
involving in TOU or RTP. Moreover, customers under RTP with option programs can avoid high
price volatility compared to RTP. Less financial risk cannot guarantee a lower cost because the
real-time electricity fluctuates. Still, it is recommended that EV customers should involve in RTP
with Option, as it reduces the exposure to price inflation risk and costs less than RTP and TOU. In
addition, the option payment, as a direct reward that varies hourly, can reinforce their acceptance
of the DR program and attract more users subscribing to DR programs.
The numerical study shows the proposed DR program's feasibility by comparing individual EV
users’ annual charging costs. RTP combined with option not only provides an appropriate
incentive for customers responding to demand requests but also reduces the grid stress caused by
the excess renewable energy supply. With consumers’ participation, fewer fossil backup power
systems are required allowing electricity utilities to optimize grid operations and resources
dynamically.
5.2

Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analysis were performed further to explore the impacts of change in annual
charging cost. Figure 5-2 illustrates the change of yearly charging cost with the change of strike
price in various percentile of HOEP, where Z axial represents the annual charging cost for EV
customers participating in the proposed DR program, in the unit of dollars. Figure 5-3 are the XZ
plane of Figure 5-2 that focus on put options’ impacts. With the increase of put option strike price,
all annual charging costs will reduce with fluctuations. When the put option’s strike price with a
larger percentile, electric utilities can start a DR event requesting charging with higher frequency;
however, there is a limitation that DR request is only available once per day. As mentioned in
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section 3.3.1, electric utilities exercise the put option if HOEP drops below the strike price for the
first time. However, if HOEP drops below the strike price after exercising the put option, electric
utilities cannot cover the potential loss due to the limitation; thus, EV customers are receiving
more financial benefits and paying less to charge their vehicles when the put option’s strike price
are set with larger percentile. It is noticeable that the decreasing trend is not decreasing steadily,
which can be explained by HOEP frequency distribution shown in Figure 5-5. For HOEP above
$40/MWh, the frequency decreases along with high unit price; therefore, the annual payment for
EV users monotonically increases as the call option’s strike price in percentile increases. When
HOEP is below $30/MWh, the frequency does not decrease monotonically; in contrast, there are
several peaks occurring, which introduces volatility on the final rewards.

Figure 5-2 Sensitive analysis on strike price in percentile
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Figure 5-3 Sensitive analysis on put option’s strike price in percentile

Figure 5-4 Sensitive analysis on call option’s strike price in percentile

Figure 5-5 2015-2019 HOEP frequency distribution

Figure 5-4 are the YZ plane of Figure 5-2 that focuses on call options’ impacts. The annual
charging cost shows a gradually increasing trend as the call option’s strike price in percentile rise
to 95. The reason is that with a smaller strike price on the call option, the opportunities of shifting
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load demand at the peak period increase. As a return of higher frequency on peak load reduction,
EV customers are rewarded with more financial incentives, so the annual charging cost decreases.
5.3

Utilities Output

In section 5.1, the result presented shows that EV consumers’ participation can significantly
reduce their charging cost by participating in the proposed DR program; however, it does not
indicate the financial benefit of the electric utilities in the new DR program. If the cost of the new
DR program is outweighed by the benefit gained, electric utilities have less potential to introduce
or expand the DR program.

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝐵𝐵 − 𝐼𝐼

(5-2)

Where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the net present value of the proposed DR program, 𝐵𝐵 is the present value of

financial benefit gained, and 𝐼𝐼 is the cost. All are in units of dollars.

Assessing the financial benefits electric utilities can obtain from the DR program requires

estimating the potential participation amount. Since the proposed DR program targets Ontario EV
users, the number of EVs on the road is a decisive factor in evaluating the DR program's
performance.
Statistics Canada [46] provided the data of new EVs registrations in Ontario from 2011 to
2020, including battery-electric (BEV), hybrid electric (HEV) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEV). The data indicates that approximately 21.57% of EVs registered are BEV. Before the
year 2011, Ontario’s EV amount was too small, which can be neglected. As shown in Figure 5-1,
before 2015, people had relatively low acceptance of EVs compared to traditional internal
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles due to range anxiety, higher retail price, and fewer choices in
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the market. The EVs’ annual registered amount shows an upward trend between 2015 and 2017,
and after that, a peak of 26,030 took place in 2018. Even affected by the health pandemic in 2020,
it still shows a considerable rise to 27,322, while only 24,226 new registered in the year 2019.
From the data, it can be expected to have more EVs on the road as EVs are receiving more positive
attention. Based on the ten years (2011-2020) observation, a second-order polynomial function is
applied to fit the data. The estimation model can be presented as follows:

𝑦𝑦 = 246.011𝑥𝑥 2 − 103.955𝑥𝑥 + 5585.117

(5-2)

Where: 𝑥𝑥 represents the year, and 𝑦𝑦 is the corresponding EVs’ annual registered amount. The
statistics of the second-order polynomial function estimating historical are:

R-square = 0.915, Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) = 2339.466

Through the regression function, it is expected that there will be about 101,900 new EVs registered
in 2030, which sums up to 795,924 EVs on the road. It is assumed that the BEV market share
keeps stable; therefore, there will be approximately 171,680 BEVs in the year 2030. Currently, the
battery capacity of a PHEV or HEV is 1/3 to 1/5 of BEV; thus, the rest of EVs corresponds to
1

additional 156,061 BEVs ((795,924 − 171,680) × = 156,061) on the road. Erdogan et al.
4

study indicate that about 40% are willing to get involved in load shifting programs [47]. Applying
the 40% statistics to the 2030 registered BEVs amount, the DR potential participation vehicles are
about 131,096 BEVs.
As more EVs are on the road, electric utilities have to invest more in grids expansion so
that the generation capacity can respond to any amount of load that planning and operations
forecasts indicated rather than causing a blackout. However, the maximum amount of load only
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occurs for short periods each year. There are two investment choices for electric utilities to support
the coincident system peak: (1) Constructing new generation capacity now and (2) deferring the
need for new generating capacity through DR programs. After presenting the cost-benefit analysis,
rational investment decisions can be made by choosing the most valuable investment.

Figure 5-6 Annual new EV registrations (2011-2030)

5.3.1 Benefit of DR program
The coincident system peak can be classified into two main types: shortfall supply and excess
demand in short periods. A higher occurrence in the shortfall supply can be expected due to the
higher market share of renewable generation. Similarly, surplus demand is often caused by
unpredicted weather conditions. For example, IESO reported that a heatwave rose the highest
hourly peak since 2013 due to significant air conditioning load on 9 July at 6 P.M. in 2020 [48].
Both show up in short periods that require a fast response backup generation with high flexibility.
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Therefore, constructing a natural gas power plant rather than renewable generation capacity should
be considered. In this research, we assess the cost and performance of a natural gas power plant
with 1000 MW based on 2019’s electricity market data.
Table 5-1: Model assumptions for natural gas power plant
Input

Value

Source

Capital Cost

1,200 $/kW

[49]

Fixed O&M Cost

14.17 $/kW∙year

[49]

Variable O&M Cost

2.56 $/MWh

[49]

Heat Rate

6,431 Btu/kWh

[49]

Lifetime

30 years

Model Assumption

The initial capital investment of a natural gas generation capacity can be varied; especially,
installing cost of those generators with the latest technology can be up to $1400 per kilowatt, but
we take the median $1200 per kilowatt in the following analysis. For a conventional gas-fired
combustion turbine, the lifetime is typically 20 to 40 years. Based on the 30 years lifetime, the
installation cost of the power plant can be levelized to an annual discounted cash flow with a proper
annual discount rate, which will be approximately $63.89 /kW. Besides, the annual fixed O&M
cost, $14.17 /kW, should be added to the annual fixed cost.

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ($/kW) =
=

(𝑟𝑟 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
+ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑂𝑂&𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
(1 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟)−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )

(5% × 1200)
+ 14.17 = $78.06/kW
(1 − (1 + 5%)−30 )
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(5-3)

Once the hypothetical generating capacity is installed and connected to the grid, it can generate
and sell electricity when it is profitable. Due to the merit order effect, the grid operators clear the
cheapest order in high priority and keep the most expensive order until the demand peak occurs.
Therefore, the natural gas generator is not online all day long; instead, it will be only available
when the market-clearing price is over the marginal cost. The hourly marginal price of the gasfired generator can be determined by:

𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ($/𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ)

= 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑂𝑂&𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

(5-4)

The annual revenue (8760 hours/year) from generation and selling can be expressed as follow.

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟($/kW)
8760

=�

0

(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)+

(5-5)

If the market-clearing price is below the profitable price level, there will be no generation revenue.
Based on the 2019 HOEP data, the annual revenue of the gas generator is $12.61/kW.
Despite the revenue from selling electricity in the market, providing ancillary services is
another profit margin connected to the grid. The IESO ancillary markets include four types of
ancillary services: certified black start, regulation service, reactive support and voltage control,
reliability must-run. The new-build gas-fired generation facility can provide regulation service to
the Ontario ancillary markets if achieving the ancillary service standards. With the proposed DR
program, there will be a guaranteed load reduction during the demand peak; therefore, the reserved
regulation service can be reduced, which diminishes the revenue from providing service to the
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ancillary markets. According to the IESO 2020 annual report on contracted ancillary service [49],
regulation service costs $37,777,084.47 to secure 235.76 MW capacity, which is approximately
$16 /kW. It should be subtracted when accounting for the avoided capacity cost due to the proposed
DR program.
In contrast to the 24/7 availability of a combustion turbine unit, the performance of DR
programs is governed by the number of load curtailment events triggered. Furthermore, to
minimize the effect on DR participants’ everyday life, most DR programs have pre-defined limits
on DR events that can be called within a short period (from few hours up to a day). Electric utilities
must send hour-ahead or day-ahead notifications to participants that also constrain the DR
performance. In other words, the avoided capacity cost will depend heavily on the relative
availability of the DR program, which can be captured through derate factor. The derate factor can
be range from 0 percent to 60 percent that varies from programs and operating conditions [14]. In
this research, we found that 5 percent is reasonable for estimating the probability that EV users are
not available to respond to DR requests.
With the above steps, the proposed DR program's annual avoided generation capacity cost is
$47.5 /kW. Therefore, the present value of avoided generation capacity cost due to the DR program
can be determined based on the 30 years lifetime of the combustion turbine generator. Adapting
from (5-3):

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 × �1 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟)−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �
=
𝑟𝑟
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(5-5)

(47.5 − 0)(1 − (1 + 5%)−30 )
=
= 730.19 $/kW
5%

Convert the result into dollars by multiply the avoided capacity, 1000 MW.
𝐵𝐵 = 730.19 $/kW × 1000 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = $ 7.301 × 108

5.3.2 Cost of DR program

Everything comes with a price, and so does the DR program. By introducing the DR program
to consumers, electric utilities defer or reduce the need to construct new plants; in return, they
must reward financial incentives to those EV customers responding to DR requests, which is the
primary operating cost for a DR program. We start evaluating the cost of the proposed DR program
for one EV user. Electric utilities purchase financial options in a day advance for any potential
load shifting (call option) and valley filling (put option). If the option expires at the end of the day,
the payment on purchasing the option is the only cost those electric utilities pay for the DR program.
On the other hand, electric utilities can exercise the option for starting DR requests when demand
peak or supply peak occurs. In such a scenario, the cost for electric utilities equals to option
purchasing fee subtracts the variation on the charging fee paid due to DR event participation. In
short, the cost of the proposed DR program（unit: $）at day ℎ can be determined by:
𝑃𝑃ℎ + 𝐶𝐶ℎ
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = �
𝑃𝑃ℎ + 𝐶𝐶ℎ − (𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (ℎ)−𝑍𝑍𝑂𝑂 (ℎ))

(5-6)

Where: 𝑃𝑃ℎ , 𝐶𝐶ℎ is the option payment to EV customers at day ℎ . Without DR event, the daily
charging cost is 𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (ℎ), and it becomes 𝑍𝑍𝑂𝑂 (ℎ) with DR event triggered that affecting charging

period.
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When evaluating the DR program's effectiveness, the result for a single year is not convincing
for investors making decisions. Therefore, we extend the cost-benefit analysis from 2020 to 2030
to generalize the proposed DR program. However, the HOEP data (2021-2030) is not available for
estimating the cost of the proposed DR program. When making an investment with uncertain
variables, Monte Carlo simulation is widely used to list multiple possible outcomes and understand
the impact of risk. In [50], Wu et al. use Monte Carlo simulation to price wind power project
market value that provides a foundation for making investment decisions in different scenarios.
Similarly, Rodríguez et al. utilize Monte Carlo simulation to estimate European wind put barrier
options to maximize profits and hedge risk [51]. Li applies Monte Carlo simulation to generate
open season day data and evaluate the construction project value, optimal investment times and
investment priorities [52]. Therefore, Monte Carlo simulation is an ideal tool to generate data and
assess risk, which can randomly generate numerous paths under the given probability distribution
from the uncertain variables (HOEP in our research). We use Monte Carlo simulation to generate
5000 numerical solutions for 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . Figure 5-7 shows 5000 numerical forecasts for 2020 to 2030 based

on equation (3-3). The HOEP means from the Monte Carlo simulation approaches a Gaussian

distribution with a mean equal to 12.87 approximately corresponding to historical data mean 12.92,
where the 95 % confidence interval is [12.78, 13.06].
We take the median path of all simulated paths for assessing DR performance as it exhibits
the same trend as the historical data. It is assuming that the risk-free interest rate compounds
annually, the net present value of DR cost for an individual EV user can be calculated by:
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10

365

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = � ��� 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� ∙

1
�
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑛𝑛

(5-7)

n=1, 2…,10
Thus, the net present value of cost for DR potential participation vehicles is determined:

10

365

𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = � ��� 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� ∙ 0.4 �� 𝑦𝑦� ∙

1
�
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑛𝑛

(5-8)

n=1, 2…,10
Where: ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦 is the accumulated EVs registered amount, 0.4 is the percentage of the DR potential

participation in percentage. By substituting the simulated data into (5-8), 𝐼𝐼 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

$ 5.027 × 108 . For other simulated paths under 95% confidence interval, 𝐼𝐼 ∈ [ 4.992 ×
108 , 5.062 × 108 ]

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝐵𝐵 − 𝐼𝐼 = 7.301 × 108 − 5.027 × 108 = $ 2.274 × 108

With the results indicating that the proposed program is worth investing in immediately,
decision-makers should start the DR program.
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Figure 5-7 Simulated paths of HOEP (2021-2030)
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CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, a summary of all the major findings and conclusions of this research will be
presented. Moreover, the research limitations and recommendations for future work will be
discussed.
6.1

Conclusion

In this research, we intend to introduce the financial option for EV customers involving in the
price-based DR program. Comprehending EVs storage capability and flexibility in power demand,
the proposed DR program can provide flexibility to the grid integrated with renewable energy
resources. The major contributions of this thesis are:
a) We apply the Black-Sholes model and the Least Squares Monte Carlo method on determining
the fair value of the financial option. Exploiting the historical data of HOEP, a two-factor
jump-diffusion model is calibrated to predict the financial risks for electricity producers in
Ontario electricity market. By purchasing financial options from EV users, the electricity
retailers can increase energy efficiency especially renewable energy when exercising options
during supply peak. Also, the potential losses during demand peak are hedged since option
contracts provide a guaranteed amount of peak load reduction from EV users.
b) Through a comparison of three different DR programs, it can be validated that the proposed
DR program (RTP with option) will deliver the most beneficial outcome to all those involved,
which significantly reducing electricity costs and price volatility for consumers. In addition,
the dynamic incentives can increase EV users’ acceptance of DR program.
c) Finally, with more consumers’ participation in DR, electric utilities can decrease the reserving
capacity for intermittent renewable energy generation, lower the likelihood of forced outages.
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For long-term benefits, the proposed DR can defer their need to construct new generation
capacity within ten years. The savings could eventually be passed to customers in the form of
lower bills.
6.2

Limitation and Recommendations

This research has potential limits. Firstly, the price forecasting model is primarily based on 5year period (from 2015 to 2019) data. In the year 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic significantly affects
the load usage and EVs sales amount. And until now, the Covid-19 pandemic is not entirely under
control. Therefore, the benefit that electric utilities can obtain from the proposed DR program
might be overestimated in the near future, as the targeted customers’ participation wiliness might
decrease. Moreover, we did not consider the friction that exists when purchasing electricity in the
market, such as transmission loss, pipe loss. In practice, the friction loss rate varies among different
charging equipment, some of which are difficult to quantify. For future studies, it is recommended
to include these elements and how they will affect EV users’ willingness to participate in the DR
program.

60

REFERENCES
[1] Natural Resources Canada, "About Renewable Energy," December 2017. [Online].
Available: https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/energy-sourcesdistribution/renewable-energy/about-renewable-energy/7295. [Accessed 6 April 2021].
[2] Canadian Wind Energy Association, "Installed Capacity," March 2020. [Online].
Available: https://canwea.ca/wind-energy/installed-capacity/. [Accessed April 2021].
[3] M. Shellenberger, "Renewable Energy Boom Risks More Blackouts Without Adequate
Investment In Grid Reliability," Forbes, 20 April 2021. [Online]. Available:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2021/04/20/why-renewables-causeblackouts-and-increase-vulnerability-to-extreme-weather/?sh=7d31399d4e75. [Accessed 5
May 2021].
[4] J. C. Ketterer, "The impact of wind power generation on the electricity price in germany,"
Energy Economics, 2014.
[5] M. H. Albadi and E. F. El-Saadany, "A summary of demand response in electricity
markets," Electric power systems research, 78(11), p. 1989–1996, 2008.
[6] Canada Energy Regulator, "Market snapshot: EVs in Canada," January 2021. [Online].
Available: https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/marketsnapshots/2019/market -snapshot-evs-incanada-hidden-potential-electric-truckmarket.html. [Accessed April 201].
[7] B. S. M. Borba, A. Szklo and R. Schaeffer, "Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles as a way to
maximize the integration of variable renewable energy in power systems: The case of wind
generation in northeastern brazil," Energy, p. 37(1):469–481, 2012.
[8] S. Bellekoma, R. Bendersa, S. Pelgrömb and H. Moll, "Electric cars and wind energy: Two
problems, one solution? A study to combine wind energy and electric cars in 2020 in The
Netherlands," Energy, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 859-866, 2012.
[9] J. Wang, C. Liu, D. Ton, Y. Zhou, J. Kim and A. Vvyas, "Impact of plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles on power systems with demand response and wind power," Energy Policy, vol. 39,
no. 7, pp. 4016-4021, 2011.
[10] P. Kaderjak, "Economics of Electricity Generation," National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners, 2007.

61

[11] M. Sewalt and C. De Jong, "Negative prices in electricity markets," Commodities Now, vol.
7, no. 74, pp. 74-77, 2003.
[12] U. S. E. I. Administration, "Monthly Energy Review," 8 2021. [Online]. Available:
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_19.pdf. [Accessed 3 9 2021].
[13] B. C. Lesieutre and J. H. Eto, "Electricity transmission congestion costs: A review of recent
reports," Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, Berkeley, 2003.
[14] R. Hledik and A. Faruqui, "Valuing demand response: International best practices, case
studies, and," The Brattle Group, INC., 2015.
[15] N. G. Paterakis, O. Erdinc and J. P. Catal˜ao, "An overview of demand
response:Keyelements and international experience," Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews, vol. 69, pp. 871-891, 2017.
[16] M. Nikzad and S. S. S. Farahani, "Studying emergency demand response programs based
on exponential modeling in smart grids," in International Conference on Renewable
Energies for Developing Countries (REDEC), Beirut, Lebanon, 2012.
[17] N. A. M. Azman, M. P. Abdullah, M. Y. Hassan, D. M. t Said and F. Hussin, "Enhanced
time of use electricity pricing for industrial customers in malaysia," Indonesian Journal of
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 155-160, 2017.
[18] R. N. Boisvert, P. A. Cappers and B. Neenan, "The benefits of customer participation in
wholesale electricity markets," The Electricity Journal, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 41-51, 2002.
[19] D. Steen, L. A. Tuan and L. Bertling, "Price-based demand-side management for reducing
peak demand in electrical distribution systems–with examples from gothenburg," in Nordic
Conference on Electricity Distribution System Management and Development (NORDAC),
Helsinki, 2012.
[20] Power Advisory Llc., "Jurisdictional review of dynamic pricing of electricity," Ontario
Energy Board, 2014.
[21] S. Borenstein, M. Jaske and A. Rosenfeld, "Dynamic pricing, advanced metering, and
demand response in electricity markets," UC Berkeley: Center for the Study of Energy
Markets, 2002.
[22] F. A. Wolak, "An Experimental Comparison of Critical Peak and Hourly Pricing: The
PowerCentsDC Program," Department of Economics Stanford University, 2010.

62

[23] "2020 Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering Staff Report," Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 2020.
[24] P. Lunt, P. Ball and A. Levers, "Barriers to industrial energy efficiency," International
Journal of Energy Sector Management, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 380-394, 2014.
[25] M. Aunedi and D. Angeli, "Economic and Environmental Benefits of Dynamic Demand in
Providing Frequency Regulation," IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, vol. 4, no. 4,
pp. 2036-2048, 2013.
[26] L. Zhang, N. Good and P. Mancarella, "Building-to-grid flexibility: Modelling and
assessment metrics for residential demand response from heat pump aggregations," Applied
Energy, vol. 233, pp. 709-723, 2019.
[27] S. Pineda and A. J. Conejo, "Using electricity options to hedge against financial risks of
power producers," Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.
101-109, 2013.
[28] F. Black and M. S. Scholes, "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of
Political, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 637-654, 1973.
[29] F. Delbaen and W. Schachermayer, "A general version of the fundamental theorem of asset
pricing," Mathematische annalen , vol. 300, no. 1, pp. 463-520, 1994.
[30] O. Sezgen, C. Goldman and P. Krishnarao, "Option value of electricity demand response,"
Energy, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 108-119, 2007.
[31] R. Kamat and S. S. Oren, "Exotic options for interruptible electricity supply contracts,"
Operations Research, vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 835-850, 2002.
[32] K. Tino, "Pricing swing options and other electricity derivatives," University of Oxford,
2006.
[33] W. Rafal, Modeling and forecasting electricity loads and prices: A statistical approach,
John Wiley & Sons, 2007.
[34] J. J. Lucia and E. S. Schwartz, "Electricity prices and power derivatives: Evidence from the
nordic power exchange," Review of derivatives research, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 5-50, 2002.
[35] J. Seifert and M. Uhrig-Homburg, "Modelling Jumps in Electricity Prices:Theory and
Empirical Evidence," Review of Derivatives Research , vol. 10, pp. 59-85, 2007.

63

[36] A. Bensoussan, "On the theory of option pricing," Acta Applicandae Mathematica volume,
vol. 2, p. 139–158, 1984.
[37] F. A. Longstaff and E. S. .. Schwartz, "Valuing american options by simulation:," The
review of financial studies, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 113-147, 2001.
[38] W. Gustafsson, "Evaluating the Longstaff-Schwartz method for pricing of American
options," Uppsala University, 2015.
[39] McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms, 6E, McGraw-Hill Companies,
Inc., 2003.
[40] I. Fahria, "PRICING BERMUDAN-TYPE CALL OPTION THROUGH BINOMIAL
TREE METHOD," AFEBI Accounting Review, vol. 03, no. 01, pp. 16-24, June, 2018.
[41] S. E. Shreve, Stochastic calculus for finance II: Continuous-time models, Springer Science
& Business Media, 2004.
[42] Independent Electricity System Operator, "Yearly power data," 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://www.ieso.ca/en/Power-Data/Data-Directory. [Accessed 21 Feburay 2021].
[43] F. L. a. A. Wang, "Electricity forward prices: a high-frequency empirical analysis," Journal
of Finance, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 1877-1900, 2004.
[44] M. S. Panel, "Monitoring Report on the IESO-Administered Electricity Markets for the
period," Ontario Energy Board, 2019.
[45] M. S. Panel, "Monitoring Report on the IESO-Administered Electricity Markets for the
period from May 2016 to October 2016," Ontario Energy Board, 2018.
[46] "Vehicle registrations, by type of vehicle," Statistics Canada, 2020.
[47] N. Erdogan, F. Erden and M. Kisacikoglu, "A fast and efficient coordinated vehicle-to-grid
discharging control scheme for peak shaving in power distribution system," Journal of
Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 555-566, 2018.
[48] "Year-End Data 2020 Year in Review," Independent Electricity System Operator, 2021.
[Online]. Available: https://www.ieso.ca/en/Corporate-IESO/Media/Year-End-Data.
[Accessed 01 08 2021].
[49] U. E. I. Administration, "Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual
Energy Outlook 2021," 2021.
64

[50] C. Wu, E. Schulz and P. Sattayatham, "Real Option Pricing Model Based on Mean
Reversion Applied in a Wind Power Project," Thai Journal of Mathematics, vol. 14, no. 3,
pp. 725-740, 2016.
[51] Y. E. Rodríguez, M. A. Pérez-Uribe and J. Contreras, "Wind Put Barrier Options Pricing
Based on the Nordix Index," Energies, vol. 14, no. 4, p. 1177, 2021.
[52] H. Li, "Incorporating climate change uncertainty into transportation infrastructure
investment," in University of Alberta, 2019.
[53] L. Bachelier, "Theory of speculation," 1990.
[54] H. Liu and J. Shi, "Applying arma–garch approaches to forecasting short-term electricity
prices," Energy Economics, vol. 37, pp. 152-166, 2013.
[55] G. Barone-Adesi and R. E. Whaley, "Efficient analytic approximation of american option
values," the Journal of Finance, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 301-320, 1987.
[56] T. Bollerslev, "Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity," Journal of
econometrics, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 307-327, 1986.
[57] R. F. Engle, "Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance
of united kingdom inflation," Econometrica, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 987-1007, 1982.
[58] P. Plötz, N. Jakobsson and F. Sprei, " On the distribution of individual daily driving
distances," Transportation research part B: methodological, vol. 101, pp. 213-227, 2017.
[59] R. C. Garcia and C. A. V. B. C, "A garch forecasting model to predict day-ahead electricity
prices," IEEE transactions on power systems, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 867-874, 2005.
[60] J. C. Cox, S. A. Ross and M. Rubinstein, "Option pricing: A simplified approach," Journal
of Financial Economics, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 229-263, 1979.
[61] IESO, "Ancillary Services," Independent Electricity System Operator, 2020. [Online].
Available: https://www.ieso.ca/ancillary-services. [Accessed 3 9 2021].
[62] M. D. Galus, F. Wietor and G. Andersson, "Incorporating valley filling and peak shaving in
a utility function based management of an electric vehicle aggregator," in 2012 3rd IEEE
PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT Europe), Berlin, 2012.

65

VITA AUCTORIS
NAME:

Hui Yang

PLACE OF BIRTH:

Guangdong, China

YEAR OF BIRTH:

1996

EDUCATION:

Affiliated High School of South China Normal University,
Guangdong, 2012 - 2014
University of Windsor, B.A.Sc., Windsor, ON, 2015 - 2019
University of Windsor, M.A.Sc., Windsor, ON, 2020 - 2021

66

